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THE JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCE:
IN SEARCH OF A NEW STANDARD
OF REVIEW
A police officer on late night patrol spotted two teenagers walking
briskly along a street in one of Atlanta's toughest southside neighbor-
hoods. Approaching the youths, the officer peered out of the squad car
window and demanded that each reveal her age. Looking at each
other, stunned, the young women responded "eighteen" and "fifteen"
respectively. The officer ordered the younger of the two into the car
and escorted her home. The fifteen year-old's presence on the street at
1 a.m. violated Atlanta's juvenile curfew law.'
1. Marilyn Milloy, Battle Lines Drawn Over Curfews, NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1990, at
15.
The Atlanta juvenile curfew ordinance provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any minor 16 years of age or younger to loiter, wander, stroll or
play in or upon the public streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, playgrounds or
other public grounds, public places, public buildings, places of amusement, eating
places, vacant lots or any place unsupervised by an adult having the lawful author-
ity to be at such places, between the hours of 11 p.m. on any day and 6 a-m. of the
following day; provided, however, that on Fridays and Saturdays the effective
hours are between 12 midnight and 6 a.m. of the following day; and provided, that
the provisions of this section shall not apply in the following instances:
(a) When a minor is accompanied by his or her parent, guardian or other adult
person having the lawful care and custody of the minor;
(b) When the minor is upon an emergency errand directed by his or her parent
or guardian or other adult person having the lawful care and custody of such mi-
nor;
(c) When the minor is returning directly home from a school activity, en-
tertainment, recreational activity or dance;
(d) When the minor is returning directly home from lawful employment that
makes it necessary to be in the above referenced places during the proscribed pe-
riod of time;
(e) When the minor is attending or travelling directly to or from an activity
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INTRODUCTION
This Note addresses the various substantive constitutional issues2
triggered by juvenile3 curfew4 ordinances. Part I of this Note briefly
considers the history of juvenile curfew ordinances. Part II examines
how federal and state courts treat juvenile rights relative to those of
adults in the context of nocturnal curfew ordinances. Part III ad-
dresses minors' substantive due process and equal protection claims
implicated by the enactment of juvenile curfew ordinances. Finally,
Part IV proposes a comprehensive framework for assessing juvenile
rights in the context of curfew ordinances.
I. HISTORY OF JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCES
State and local governments began enacting juvenile curfew ordi-
nances in the United States during the nineteenth century.5 Prior to
the Civil War, southern towns enacted curfew ordinances prohibiting
the presence of slaves and free blacks on public streets between certain
involving the exercise of first amendment rights of free speech, freedom of assembly
or free exercise of religion;
(f) When the minor is in a motor vehicle with parental consent for normal
travel, with interstate travel through the City of Atlanta, excepted in all cases from
the curfew.
ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, § 17-7002 (1990).
2. This Note does not address the various procedural issues resulting from the en-
actment of a juvenile curfew ordinance. See, e.g., Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545
F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (invalidating a juvenile curfew ordinance on vagueness
grounds for its failure to establish a curfew cutoff time); In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385, 1388
(Haw. 1973) (invalidating a juvenile curfew ordinance on vagueness and overbreadth
grounds because the term "loitering" is too vague and imprecise).
3. For purposes of this Note, the terms "juveniles," "children," and "minors" shall
be used interchangeably. Each shall refer to youths restricted by juvenile curfew
ordinances.
4. A curfew is a "law (commonly an ordinance) which imposes on people (particu-
larly children) the obligation to remove themselves from the street on or before a certain
time of night." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 381 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (Md.
1964) (providing a brief overview of the history of curfew regulations). Long before
American independence, Alfred the Great introduced the curfew regulation to England.
Id. The regulation provided that the inhabitants of Oxford should cover and protect
the fires in their homes and go to bed at the tolling of the curfew bell. Id. Later in
English history, William the Conqueror strictly enforced curfew regulations to guard
against fire and to prevent the citizenry from gathering at night. Id. See also Jeffrey F.
Ghent, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Curfew Statute, Ordinance, or Procla-
mation, 59 A.L.R. 3D 321, 325-26 (1974).
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hours.6 Since the nineteenth century, american states, cities, and towns
have imposed curfews for purposes such as maintaining the peace in
emergencies,7 limiting the operating hours of public parks,8 keeping
6. Several courts have assessed the constitutional validity of the pre-Civil War cur-
few ordinances. See, eg., Mayor of Memphis v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. (8 Hum.) 707, 710
(Tenn. 1848) (invalidating an "oppressive" municipal ordinance directing police to
arrest and fine all free blacks on the street after 10 p.m). Notably, as recently as 1970
curfews based on race existed in the United States. See, e.g., Chase v. Twist 323 F.
Supp. 749, 766 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (refusing to enjoin mayor, sheriff, or police from im-
posing curfews against blacks because plaintiffs did not establish their various
allegations).
7. Several courts have assessed the constitutional validity of emergency curfews.
See, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir.) (upholding a curfew
issued as a result of riots between police and black high school students), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 943 (1971); People v. McKelvy, 100 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)
(declaring that a showing of clear and emergent necessity engendered by race riots justi-
fied imposition of a curfew); Davis v. Justice Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970) (upholding the issuance of a curfew over a housing project in which riotous
conditions existed); State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 925 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967) (upholding
curfew issued when property destruction and riotous conditions threatened the city's
general welfare); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 559 (D.C. 1969) (up-
holding a curfew barring all persons except police, firemen, medical personnel and sani-
tation workers from the streets as a reasonable and usual police regulation in response
to serious disorders throughout the city); Municipal Court v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193,
194-95 (Fla. 1971) (invalidating a mayor's curfew issuance because the power to issue
curfews during times of emergency belonged to the City Commissioner); Walsh v. City
of River Rouge, 189 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Mich. 1971) (holding that in times of civil disor-
der and riot the city may not issue curfews absent an action by the governor because
state action preempts city action in such circumstances); State v. Dobbins, 178 S.E.2d
449, 456 (N.C. 1971) (enacting an emergency curfew ordinance was a valid use of the
state's police power when the city faced imminent threat of widespread burning and
other destruction to public and private property); Ervin v. State, 163 N.W.2d 207, 210-
11 (Wis. 1968) (upholding a municipal curfew imposed to restore order after the out-
break of local riots).
8. Courts assessing the constitutional validity of curfews in parks often find the or-
dinances reasonable. See, e.g., Peters v. Breier, 322 F. Supp. 1171, 1172 (E.D. Wis.
1971) (upholding a curfew ordinance because it restricted use of a carefully defined area
(a park) during specified hours, provided appropriate notice, and applied to all persons
indiscriminately); People v. Trantham, 208 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that a city ordinance prohibiting any person from entering, remaining, staying
or loitering in a public park between the hours of 10:30 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. was not
overbroad or vague); Chicago Park Dist. v. Altman, 262 N.E.2d 373, 374 (I. App. Ct.
1970) (holding that a regulation limiting the use of a park between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m.
was a reasonable use of the park district's power); People v. Zalon, 145 N.Y.S.2d 269,
270-71 (1955) (holding that a park department regulation prohibiting persons from loi-
tering or remaining in parks between midnight and one-half hour before sunrise did not
infringe on one's civil liberties to an unconstitutional degree); State v. Allred, 204
S.E.2d 214, 218-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that imposing a curfew on a park
1992]
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vagrants off the streets,9 and providing for the national security during
times of war.1" In the twentieth century the most prevalent and perva-
sive curfew ordinances have focused on juveniles." In response to the
increase in juvenile criminal activity,' 2 various state, 13 city 14 and
during a state of emergency was a valid use of the state's police power), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1127 (1975).
9. Vagrancy curfews have also resulted in litigation. See, eg., Guidoni v. Wheeler,
230 F. 93, 96-97 (9th Cir. 1916) (upholding a city ordinance defining vagrants as all
persons without known employment on the street after 11:00 p.m.); Ruff v. Marshall,
438 F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (invalidating on overbreadth grounds a curfew
ordinance restricting loitering upon any public place of business after business hours);
City of Shreveport v. Brewer, 72 So. 2d 308, 309-10 (La. 1954) (invalidating for vague-
ness an ordinance providing penalties for people "[w]ho shall be on the street after
midnight without a satisfactory explanation"); City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554,
556 (Or. 1968) (invalidating on vagueness grounds an ordinance making it unlawful for
any person to roam or be upon any street between I a.m. and 5 a.m.).
10. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (holding valid under the
war power curfew regulations created under an executive order imposed upon all per-
sons of Japanese ancestry in military areas during World War II); Ex parte Ventura, 44
F. Supp. 520, 523 (W.D. Wash. 1942) (upholding a restriction on movement of Ameri-
can born citizens of Japanese ancestry in critical military areas essential for national
defense during World War II).
11. Initially, juvenile curfew ordinances manifested native-born Americans' fear
that recently arrived immigrants could not control their children. Francis J. Flaherty,
Curfew Law Sparks Battle in Detroit, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 10, 43. By 1900,
approximately 3000 villages and municipalities had juvenile curfew ordinances. Ghent,
supra note 5, at 326. In 1964, forty-eight cities with populations greater than 100,000
enforced juvenile curfew ordinances while nine other cities in that population category
had unenforced juvenile curfew ordinances on the books. Id. See also Thistlewood v.
Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. 1964); Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Con-
trol of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66 (1958) (detailing the results of
a survey determining which major cities in the United States had curfew ordinances in
1958).
12. Between 1985 and 1989 the total number of juveniles (under the age of 18)
arrested increased 2.3% from 1.59 to 1.63 million. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 178 (1989). During that
same period, the number of juveniles arrested for violent crimes increased 21% from
65,880 to 79,709. Id. Juvenile arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter in-
creased 67.1% from 1,248 in 1985 to 2,086 in 1989 while juvenile arrests for aggravated
assault increased 40.3% from 31,178 to 43,751 during that same period. Id. Between
1988 and 1989 juvenile murder arrests increased 18% while murder arrests for persons
18 years of age and older increased only 3%. Id. at 13.
13. See, eg., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-1-5 (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 722.730-722.754 (West 1968 & Supp. 1991) (state amended section 722.752 in
1972); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 419.710-419.760 (1987).
14. See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., CHARTER AND CODE OF ORDINANCES OF THE CITY
ch. 7, § 17-7002 (1990); DETROIT, MICH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 33, art. III §§ 1-3
(1987); Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 45.03 (1988); PHILADELPHIA, PA.,
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town15 governments enacted, or increased enforcement of, 6 legislation
aimed at keeping children off the streets during defined nighttime
hours. Although enacting juvenile curfew ordinances is an inexpensive
means of attempting to control juvenile crime,17 the curfews are diffi-
cult to enforce,18 disliked by large segments of the public,19 arguably
CODE ch. 10, §§ 300-309 (1980); PUEBLO, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 11-1-703
(1982); TRENTON, N.J., CrrY ORDINANCES § 83-134 (1983). Other cities have enacted
juvenile curfew statutes which courts later invalidated on constitutional grounds. See,
e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134-40 (D.D.C. Cir. 1989) (invalidating the
Washington, D.C. curfew ordinance on substantive due process and equal protection
grounds).
15. See, &g., BELZONI, MISS., ORDINANCE 491 (1991); DREW, MISS., ORDINANCE
ESTABLISHING A CURFEW FOR UNEMANCIPATED MINORS UNDER THE AGE OF
EIGHTEEN YEARS IN THE CITY OF DREW PROVIDING THE PENALTY THEREFORE
AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES (1991); INDIANOLA, MISS., ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING
A CURFEW FOR UNEMANCIPATED MINORS UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS IN
THE CITY OF INDIANOLA PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFORE AND FOR RELATED PUR-
POSES (1991).
16. Cities or towns often enact juvenile curfew ordinances and leave them on the
books, unenforced, for several years. In response to increasing crime rates, the police
have the option of stepping up enforcement of these curfews to keep minors off the
streets and in the home. For example, in 1983, Detroit attempted to answer its urban
crime problem by strictly enforcing its 1976 juvenile curfew ordinance for the first time.
Mayor Imposes Juvenile Curfew: Hot Summer In Detroit?, ClaM. JUST. NEWSL., (Nat'l
Council on Crime and Delinquency, San Francisco, Cal.), Aug. 1, 1983, at 7. See also
Flaherty, supra note 11, at 10. Cities or towns may also enact or update juvenile curfew
ordinances to more effectively combat new types of juvenile crime. For example, the
city of Los Angeles rewrote its curfew ordinance in 1987, twenty years after the law's
inception, to control epidemic gang violence. Strong enforcement of the updated ordi-
nance resulted in a decrease in gang related homicides and shootings. Joyce Price, Cur-
few Laws Sweep Kids Off Streets, But Police Wonder 'Does It Work?', WASHINGTON
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at Al.
17. Price, supra note 16, at Al. Commentators argue that the imposition of a juve-
nile curfew ordinance is an inexpensive and expedient method by which a politician can
appease constituents complaining about increasing local crime rates. Id.
18. Id. Some commentators argue that the lack of governmental resources makes
the enforcement of curfew ordinances difficult. Id. For example, the state, city, or town
enacting the curfew may not have the funding necessary to put extra police officers on
the streets to enforce the curfew ordinance. Id. Therefore, when a legislature enacts a
curfew without appropriating additional funds to the police department for enforce-
ment, the department must either take resources away from other important police ac-
tivities, such as murder, rape, and burglary investigation and prevention, to enforce the
curfew or it must elect not to enforce the curfew. Id.
19. See, eg., Mark Mayfield, Curfew Clock Ticks For Teens, USA TODAY, Dec. 11,
1990, at 3A (quoting teenagers who argue that juvenile curfew ordinances are unfair
because the responsibility for raising the children rests on the parents, not on the state);
Clarence Page, Why Atlanta's Teen Curfew Misses the Mark, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1990,
at C25. (arguing that juvenile curfews will victimize black males who will dispropor-
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ineffective,2° and legally questionable under various constitutional
theories.21
II. FEDERAL AND STATE COURT TREATMENTS OF MINORS'
RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NOCTuRNAL CURFEW
ORDINANCES
Although the Supreme Court has clearly stated that certain constitu-
tional guarantees apply to children,22 it has also posited that juveniles'
tionately be confronted by police during proscribed hours because a majority of the
crimes perpetrated in the cities are committed by blacks).
20. See, e.g., Marilyn Milloy, Battle Lines Drawn Over Curfews, NEWSDAY, Dec.
16, 1990, at 15 (arguing that juvenile curfew ordinances are ineffective in halting the
increasing juvenile crime rates); Price, supra note 16, at Al (quoting law enforcement
authorities claiming that juvenile curfew ordinances are an ineffective response to
crime). At least one commentator argues that a substantial proportion of juvenile
crimes go undetected; therefore, an accurate assessment of a juvenile curfew's effective-
ness is impossible. Note, supra note 11, at 95. The author also makes the following
generalizations regarding the effectiveness of curfews: juveniles who adhere to curfew
ordinances generally do not engage in criminal activity; curfews will not deter juveniles
who engage in criminal activity; and juveniles on the "fringe" of delinquency may be
deterred from violating the curfew because of the potential punishment to their parents.
Id. at 96-97. Contra Milloy, supra, at 15 (psychoanalyst Dr. Francis lanni of Colum-
bia's Teachers College argues that juvenile curfew ordinances can have the unintended
effect of challenging generally law abiding juveniles to beat a system they think is
unfair).
21. See infra notes 69-134 and accompanying text discussing the constitutional is-
sues ofjuvenile curfews.
22. See, eg., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 648 (1979) (holding that a Massachu-
setts statute unduly burdened a minor's right to obtain an abortion because it required a
pregnant minor to obtain both parents' consent or judicial approval); Carey v. Popula-
tion Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 697-99 (1977) (holding that a New York statute uncon-
stitutionally invaded a minor's right to privacy because it denied minors under the age
of 16 access to birth control); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-74
(1976) (invalidating a Missouri statute requiring an unmarried woman under the age of
18 to obtain parental consent prior to obtaining an abortion unless a licensed physician
determined that the abortion was required to preserve the life of the mother); Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531-32 (1975) (holding that the prosecution of a minor in a supe-
rior court, after an adjudicatory proceeding in a juvenile court, violated the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-76 (1975)
(holding that minors suspended from school for up to ten days without a hearing were
denied due process of law); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972) (holding
that the state may not compel children who complete the eighth grade to attend formal
high school through the age of 16); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970) (holding
that juveniles are entitled to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard for convic-
tion when charged with a criminal law violation); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that not allowing minors to wear
black armbands while protesting the Vietnam War violated minors' First Amendment
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol41/iss1/6
JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCE
rights are not coextensive with adults' rights in all situations.23 In Bel-
lotti v. Baird,24 the Supreme Court cited certain juvenile characteristics
that lower courts often consider in determining whether a state may
encroach upon minors' constitutional rights to a greater degree than
those of adults.25 Whether these concerns should apply outside of the
abortion rights context remains unclear.26 Nonetheless, several lower
courts have considered these concerns in analyzing juvenile curfew or-
dinances and have obtained inconsistent results.2 7
rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a juvenile has the right to notice of
charges, to counsel, to cross-examination and confrontation of witnesses, and to privi-
leges against self-incrimination); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that an Oregon statute requiring
minors to attend public school was a liberty deprivation under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
23. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. Number 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)
(declaring that the First Amendment does not protect discourse among school children
to the same extent that it does discourse among adults); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 409 (1981) (upholding a Utah statute requiring physicians to notify parents before
performing an abortion on an immature dependent); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-
08 (1979) (upholding a Georgia statute permitting parents to voluntarily commit their
children to mental institutions without a formal, judicial type hearing); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of the disciplinary pad-
dling of students who received no prior notice or hearing); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (holding that a trial by jury is not required in the adjudicative
stage of a state juvenile court proceeding); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-38
(1968) (holding that the state may constitutionally accord minors under 17 a more re-
stricted right to sexual material than that assured to adults); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 169-71 (1944) (holding that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting magazine
sales by children on the streets did not violate their First Amendment rights). See also
Robert B. Keiter, Priacy, Children, and Their Parents Reflections On and Beyond the
Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MIN. L. Rv. 459, 467 (1982) (stating that the
Supreme Court's extension of rights to children is qualified because the rights of chil-
dren "are not commensurate with those available to adults"); Irene M. Rosenberg, The
Constitutional Rights of Children Charged With Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not
So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 701 (1980) ("fT]he Court's reluctance to ex-
tend full constitutional protection to alleged juvenile delinquents may reflect the view
that the liberty interest of the child is simply not as extensive as that of an adult.").
24. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
25. Id. at 634. The Court noted that the status of minors under the law has long
been recognized as unique in many respects. Id. at 633. The Court then recognized
that children's constitutional rights cannot be equated with those of adults because of
children's peculiar vulnerability, their inability to make critical decisions in a mature
and informed manner, and the importance of parents in child rearing. Id. at 634. See
also infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 64 for an analysis of the difficulties courts face in applying the
Bellotti concerns to different factual settings.
27. Compare Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989) with People ex rel.
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In Bellotti, the Supreme Court determined the constitutional validity
of a statute requiring pregnant minors to obtain either both parents'
permission or judicial permission to have an abortion.2" The Court
held the statute unconstitutional on the ground that it unduly infringed
upon a minor's right to seek an abortion.29 The Court cited three rea-
sons why the state may, in certain circumstances, restrict children's
constitutional rights to a greater degree than those of adults: the
child's peculiar vulnerability,30 the child's inability to make critical de-
cisions" in an informed, mature manner," and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing.33
J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989). See infra notes 35-64 for a detailed analysis of the
above cases.
28. 443 U.S. at 625-26. In Bellotti, the Court determined the constitutionality of a
Massachussetts abortion law which provided in pertinent part:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of
both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is
required. If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may
be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown ....
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979), quoted in Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 625-26 (1979).
29. 443 U.S. at 648.
30. Id. at 634. The Court indicated that its decisions according minors constitu-
tional protection against deprivations of liberty and property interests in certain situa-
tions demonstrated its concern for the vulnerability of children. Id. at 634-35. Notably,
the Court's primary concern was the mental, not physical, vulnerability of minors; the
Court declared that "the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for chil-
dren's vulnerability and their needs for 'conern ... sympathy, and... paternal atten-
tion.'" Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)). See
also Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors'Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the
Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
primary concern in Bellotti was the mental, not physical, vulnerability of the child).
31. 443 U.S. at 634. The Court held that a critical decision is an "important affirm-
ative choice[] with potentially serious consequences." Id. at 635.
32. Id. at 634. The Court based its concern for minors' decision making capabilities
on the "recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, mi-
nors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them." Id. at 635. Notably, several commentators
question this justification for denying juveniles the same rights accorded adults. See,
e.g., Robert Batey, The Rights of-Adolescents, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 363, 370 (1982)
(arguing that because many adolescents have the moral reasoning capacities of adults,
the law should accord competent adolescents' considered choices the same treatment it
accords the considered choices of adults).
33. 443 U.S. at 634. The Court justified state deference to the parental control over
children through two theories. First, it recognized that the state often "protects its
youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring
parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors." Id. at 637. Sec-
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In the past decade, some courts examining the validity of juvenile
curfew ordinances have considered the Bellotti rationale in determining
whether children's constitutional rights should parallel those of adults
in the nocturnal curfew ordinance context. A consensus has yet to
appear.34
A. The Courts' Varying Applications of Bellotti to Juvenile
Curfew Ordinances
In People ex rel. J.M , the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed the
Bellotti concerns and determined that nocturnal curfew ordinances
may, within constitutional bounds, restrain the rights of minors to a
greater degree than those of adults.36 The court first disposed of the
"peculiar vulnerability of the child" consideration by summarily con-
cluding that children who leave their homes at night are more vulnera-
ble to crime and peer pressure than adults.3 7
This finding does not persuasively differentiate children's rights from
adults' rights for four reasons. First, the court failed to factually sup-
port its assertion.38 The court did not rely on expert testimony or sta-
ond, the Court declared that the those who nurture the child and direct his destiny have
the right to recognize and prepare the child for future obligations. Id.
34. Some courts do not even use the Bellotti analysis to determine the validity of
juvenile curfew ordinances. See infra note 65 for a list of courts that have refused to
apply the Bellotti framework.
35. 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989).
36. Id. at 223. In People ex reL JM. the court determined the constitutional valid-
ity of the Pueblo, Colorado juvenile curfew ordinance which provided in pertinent part:
[i]t shall be unlawful... for any person under the age of 18 years to loiter on or
about any street, sidewalk, curb, gutter, parking lot, alley, vacant lot, park, play-
ground or yard, whether public or private, without the consent or permission of the
owner or occupant thereof, during the hours between 10:00 o'clock P.M. and 6:00
o'clock A.M ... unless accompanied by a parent, guardian or other adult person
over the age of twenty-one yeari.
PUEBLO, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11-1-703 (1982), quoted in People ex rel. J.M.,
768 P.2d 219, 221 (Colo. 1989).
37. 768 P.2d at 223. When the court notes that children are more vulnerable to
crime than adults, it apparently means that children are more likely to be victims of
crimes because the court separately considered children's likelihood to commit criminal
acts. Id.
38. For example, the court should have based its conclusion on current scientific
evidence which indicates that adolescents are more responsive to peer pressure than
older persons because of the adolescents' desire to conform. See Note, Juvenile Curfew
Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 MICH. L. REv. 109, 131 (1977) (citing Castanzo
and Shaw, Conformity as a Function of Level, in READINGS IN ADOLESCENT DEVELOP-
MENT AND BEHAVIOR (J. Itell & J. Shelton eds., 1971)); Query, The Influence of Group
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tistical information in concluding that a child's vulnerability to peer
pressure and crime is greater than that of an adult. Second, the court
failed to indicate why children are more easily influenced during cur-
few hours than during other hours of the day. Third, the court failed
to acknowledge that children's levels of vulnerability to crime and peer
pressure may vary. A generalization concerning the rights of all chil-
dren under the curfew age does not adequately differentiate children's
constitutional rights from those of adults.39 Finally, the court's con-
cern that children are more vulnerable to crime than adults is imperti-
nent to the Bellotti analysis because Bellotti is only concerned with the
child's mental, not physical, vulnerability.' ° Accordingly, the court er-
roneously concluded that children are more vulnerable than adults
during curfew hours.
The People ex rel J.M. court next addressed the concern that chil-
dren cannot make critical decisions for themselves.41 The court con-
cluded that because children are immature, they may decide to engage
in delinquent acts if permitted out of the home during proscribed
hours.42
The court's application of the Bellotti scheme is unconvincing be-
cause the court again failed to ground its conclusion on factual prem-
ises, distinguish among children of different mental capacities, 43 and
explain why children are more likely to make poor decisions at night
than during the day. The court's unsubstantiated conclusion that chil-
dren lack the ability to make critical decisions during curfew hours
Pressures on the Judgments of Children and Adolescents - A Comparative Study, 3 ADO-
LESCENCE 153 (1969)).
39. See generally Batey, supra note 32, at 369 (citing studies which indicated that
not all children have the same mental capacity; thus, the author argues, the law should
not treat all children the same).
40. See supra note 30 for a discussion of the Bellotti Court's reasoning.
41. 768 P.2d at 223.
42. Id. The court acknowledged that adults may make the same decisions as chil-
dren with respect to committing an indiscretion, but the former "are more likely to do
so in an informed and mature manner with full consideration of the consequences of
their acts." Id. This argument may be persuasive with respect to a very young minor,
but to a 17 year-old juvenile of average intelligence who falls under the Pueblo ordi-
nance, the court's assertion is inadequate. Seniors in high school know that if they
decide to commit crimes, punishment will ensue, harming their futures.
43. See Batey, supra note 32, at 373 (arguing that "the law should accord the con-
sidered choices of competent adolescents the same treatment it accords similar choices
of adults").
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does not justify the state's restriction on minors' important constitu-
tional rights.
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court determined, without substanti-
ation, that restricting minors from leaving the home during specified
nighttime hours reinforces parental authority and encourages parents
to actively supervise their children.
44
Once again, the court's conclusion lacks justification and can be re-
futed on several grounds. First, restricting a child from leaving the
home may have no impact on the amount of parental supervision.
Many parents do not or cannot pay adequate attention to a child who
is home.45 Second, a juvenile curfew ordinance may encourage parents
to leave the home during proscribed hours with the belief that the po-
lice will baby-sit their children by preventing them from leaving their
homes during the curfew. Finally, the court's conclusion is based on
the punishment provision of the Pueblo, Colorado curfew ordinance.
This ordinance fails to punish the parent for a child's curfew viola-
tion.46 Therefore, the ordinance gives parents no greater incentive to
supervise their children than if the curfew did not exist. Because the
court failed to address these considerations, its refusal to vindicate mi-
nors' rights on the basis that the curfew promotes parental authority is
unpersuasive. 47
On the federal level, the court in Waters v. Barry 4 held that a juve-
nile curfew ordinance accorded children's constitutional rights no less
protection than those of adults. 49 The Waters court considered Bel-
44. 768 P.2d at 223.
45. In asserting that the juvenile curfew ordinance encourages parental supervision
of children, the court implicitly assumes that the parents of all children are in the home
during the proscribed nighttime hours. Id. This assumption fails to account for several
situations in which the parent leaves the home at night on a regular basis for either
legitimate or illegitimate reasons; eg., the single parent who must work at night to
support the family; the doctor or medical student in residency who spends many, if not
most, of her nights working in the hospital or clinic; and, the parent who leaves the
home at night for the purpose of socializing with other adults at a neighborhood tavern.
46. See PUEBLO, COLO., MUNICIPAL CODE § 11-1-703 (1982) infra note 36.
47. It should be noted, however, that three other courts assessing the Bellotti con-
cerns used the same reasoning as the Colorado Supreme Court and similarly concluded
that children should not retain the same rights as adults with respect to their ability to
leave the home at night. See McCollester v. City of Keene, 514 F. Supp. 1046, 1050-51
(D.N.H. 1981); Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 15-16 (Il1. 1990); City
of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1988).
48. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
49. Id. at 1137. The court determined the constitutional validity of the Washing-
ton, D.C. juvenile curfew ordinance. The ordinance provided that no minors under the
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lotti's concern for a child's vulnerability and determined that the crime
plague afflicting Washington, D.C. posed no peculiar danger to chil-
dren."0 The court found that although the city's crime problem af-
fected thousands of children engaging in innocent activities, the
problem did not affect children any more than similarly situated
adults."1 Based on the "peculiar vulnerability of the child" concern of
Bellotti, the court refused to permit the state to infringe upon the con-
stitutional rights of minors to a greater extent than it would permit the
state to infringe upon the rights of adults.52
The Waters court next addressed the second Bellotti concern that
juveniles lack the ability to make critical decisions.5 3 Waters deter-
mined that the child's decision to leave the home at night was not criti-
cal within the meaning of Bellotti because such a decision rarely leads
to serious consequences. 4 The court, concerned for the city's innocent
children, argued that the decision to leave the home at night is not
critical.55 It becomes critical only when the minor commits an illegal
age of 18 years may remain in or upon any street, sidewalk, park or other outdoor
public place in the District of Columbia between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
each day except Friday and Saturday when the curfew commenced at 11:59 p.m.
WASHINGTON, D.C., TEMPORARY EMERGENCY CURFEW ACT (1989). The ordinance
exempted "minors traveling in automobiles, minors accompanied by parents (but not
others), minors returning by a direct route from a pre-registered religious or other non-
profit activity, so long as it is within 60 minutes of the activity's termination, a minor
engaged in legitimate employment who has on his person a valid work or theatrical
permit, and a minor required by 'reasonable necessity' to conduct an emergency errand
relating to the health of a family member, so long as the minor has, if practicable, a note
from a parent to that effect." 711 F. Supp. at 1135.
50. 711 F. Supp. at 1137. The court reasoned that crime does not peculiarly affect
children in Washington, D.C. because only 7% of the 372 homicide victims in the Dis-
trict of Columbia in 1988 were juveniles. Id. at 1139.
51. Id. at 1137.
52. Id. In Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals similarly held that the concern for children's peculiar vulnera-
bility emphasized in Bellotti is not implicated in the curfew context because children
engage in many legitimate activities at night, such as attending or traveling to or from a
religious, school, commercial or other bona fide organized activities. Id at 1072. The
Johnson court reasoned that the vulnerability children may feel with respect to these
activities is nothing like the vulnerability the Bellotti Court referred to in setting chil-
dren apart from adults. Id. at 1073.
53. 711 F. Supp. at 1137.
54. Id. See supra note 31 for the Bellotti Court's definition of a critical decision.
55. 711 F. Supp. at 1137. The court found that the decision to either stay home or
go out at night "simply does not present the type of profound decision which Bellotti
would leave to the state." Id.
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indiscretion. 6 The court concluded that the vast majority of juveniles
rarely, if ever, entertain the decision to engage in criminal activity.57
Thus, the court held that an ordinance should not restrict children's
rights more than adults' rights because the decision to leave the home
at night is critical to only a few children. 8
The Waters court completed its Bellotti analysis by assessing the or-
dinance's impact on the parental role in supervising children.59 The
court determined that the curfew ordinance implicitly rested upon the
assumption that the traditional family unit ° had dissolved in many
areas of the city.61 Although the court agreed that this dissolution ex-
isted, it disagreed that the breakdown in a minority of the city's fami-
lies justified imposing a curfew infringing upon all children's rights,
56. Id.
57. Id. Nocturnal activities "in all but the exceptional case" will not have serious
consequences. Id.
58. Id. By concluding that the curfew unfairly proscribed the innocent conduct of
many children, the court asserted that the curfew ordinance was overly broad. Id. Ear-
lier in its decision, however, the court determined that an overbreadth analysis was
inappropriate because:
... the overbreadth doctrine is essentially ajus tertil device; it evolved in order to
permit one properly charged under a statute to raise the First Amendment rights of
others, not charged, whose associational or expressive rights might be chilled by
enforcement of overly broad legislation. However, when, as here, the plaintiffs are
themselves engaged in protected activity - when the challenged statute would have
no greater impact upon the rights of nonparties than it would have upon the rights
of the parties before the Court - there is no need to employ a traditional over-
breadth analysis.
Id. at 1133.
In Johnson v. City of Opelousas, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also argued that
children's rights could not be infringed upon to a greater extent than adults' rights
because the decision to engage in illegal activities does not involve critical decisionmak-
ing. 658 F.2d at 1073. The Johnson court went on to state:
[i]t would be anomalous to permit minors to express their views on divisive public
issues and to obtain abortions without parental consent but to deny them the right
to decide, within the bounds of parental judgment, whether or not to engage in
[various legal] activities which at present are proscribed by the curfew ordinance.
Id. (citations omitted).
59. 711 F. Supp. at 1137.
60. The court defined the traditional family unit as a family "in which parents exer-
cise control over their childrens' [sic] activities." Id.
61. Id. The court implied that the Washington, D.C. city council passed the juve-
nile curfew ordinance because they believed that the government had to act in loco
parentis to respond to the breakdown of the traditional family structure in the city. Id.
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regardless of their family structure.6 2 The court concluded that the
curfew ordinance wrongly assumed the sacred responsibilities of
parenthood. Instead of improving the parents' supervisory role over
their children, the ordinance actually interfered with the parents' right
to control their children as they saw fit.63 For this reason, the court
held that the state must protect minors' rights the same as those of
adults in the curfew ordinance context."
B. Concluding Remarks Concerning the Rights of Children in the
Curfew Ordinance Context
As the above analysis indicates, there is presently no precedential
method for determining minors' rights relative to those of adults in the
curfew ordinance context.6 5 The Supreme Court's failure to establish a
62. Id. The Waters court failed to factually support its conclusion that most fami-
lies maintain the traditional family structure. Id.
63. 711 F. Supp. at 1137. See also Note, supra note 30, at 1179 (arguing that
"[j]uvenile curfews ... [allow] the state to usurp parental authority over children's
liberty").
64. Id. The court in Johnson v. City of Opelousas also determined that juvenile
curfew ordinances inhibit, rather than promote, the parental role in child-rearing be-
cause, by imposing a curfew, the government removes parents' authority over their chil-
dren with respect to the children's nighttime activity. 658 F.2d at 1073-74. The court
concluded that "[t]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 1074 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944)).
At least two other courts have found that, pursuant to the Bellotti concerns, night-
time curfews should not restrict children's rights to a greater extent than those of
adults. See McColester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1385-86 (D.N.H. 1984);
Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478, 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
65. While Bellotti's three concerns provide lower courts with the criteria to differen-
tiate children from adults, the criteria is difficult to apply in situations factually different
from Bellotti. The People ex reL J.M. and Waters decisions typify the outcomes result-
ing from an application of the Bellotti analysis; they are inconsistent and irreconcilable.
See supra notes 35-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of People ex reL J.M. and
Waters. Many courts refuse to apply the Bellotti framework to determine minors' rights
relative to those of adults in the context of juvenile curfew ordinances. See, eg., John-
son v. City of Opelousas, 488 F. Supp. 433, 440 (W.D. La. 1980) (concluding, without
assessing the Bellotti concerns, that the state has the power to regulate the well-being of
its children), rev'd, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981); S.W. v. State, 431 So. 2d 339, 341
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding, without assessing the Bellotti concerns, that the
"[g]overnment has a legitimate right to enact laws for the protection of minors, but such
laws must reasonably relate to their purpose without unduly limiting individual free-
doms"); T.F. v. State, 431 So. 2d 343, 343 (Fla. 1983) (following the rationale of S. W. v.
State); City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 42 Ohio Misc. 2d I (Wadsworth Mun. Ct. 1987)
(determining, without assessing the Belotti concerns, that when an ordinance infringes
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comprehensive framework for analyzing minors' rights has perpetuated
the lower courts' apparent difficulty in assessing the constitutional va-
lidity of juvenile curfew ordinances." The lower courts' problems in
determining the validity of juvenile curfews is characterized by their
inconsistent application of various levels of scrutiny to equal protec-
tion67 and substantive due process68 analyses of the curfew ordinances
concerning minors' rights. Determining a juvenile curfew ordinance's
constitutionality requires separate treatment of these issues.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF REGULATED MINORS
IMPLICATED BY THE ENACTMENT OF JUVENILE CURFEW
ORDINANCES
A. The Equal Protection Claim
Regulated minors have sought to invalidate juvenile curfew ordi-
nances on the grounds*of discrimination based on age,69 wealth,70 or
educational background. 7 1 The decisions assessing these concerns
upon minors' fundamental rights, the ordinance's validity will be strictly scrutinized);
In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1978) (reaching the same
conclusion as the Owens court).
66. Two Supreme Court justices acknowledged that the Court has yet to resolve
"whether the due process rights of juveniles are entitled to lesser protection than those
of adults," Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 429 U.S. 964, 965 (1976) (Marshall, J.
dissenting from a denial of certiorari).
67. See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of equal protection
analysis.
68. See infra notes 86-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of due process
analysis.
69. See, eg., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 488 F. Supp. 433, 440 (W.D. La. 1980)
(holding that an ordinance classifying on the basis of age is subject to rational basis
review because this classification is not suspect), rev'd, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981);
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1265 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (holding
that age-based classifications must be scrutinized using rational basis review), aff'd per
curiam, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (three justices dis-
senting); People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945) (hold-
ing that rational basis review is appropriate for legislation peculiarly applicable to
minors because they constitute a class founded upon a natural and intrinsic distinction
from adults).
70. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp 1121, 1123 (D.D.C. 1989) (positing that
a juvenile curfew ordinance has the potential to discriminate based on wealth because
poor city children lack large backyards and often play in the street, an area the curfew
strictly proscribed).
71. See, eg., In re Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1978) (hold-
ing that a juvenile curfew ordinance provision exempting minors who graduate from an
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under an equal protection analysis are more consistent than those ad-
dressing minors' fundamental rights under a substantive due process
analysis.7 2 The Supreme Court has clearly established the appropriate
levels of scrutiny courts should apply in assessing each of these equal
protection classifications, but has not been as specific when analyzing
substantive due process claims brought to invalidate juvenile curfew
ordinances.73 Current Supreme Court doctrine mandates that if a clas-
sification rests upon a real and substantial difference between the regu-
lated and non-regulated parties, a court must apply rational basis
review to the pertinent law.
The Supreme Court currently requires that an age-based classifica-
tion rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose to survive judicial
scrutiny.74 Cases involving gender, alienage, or some other semi-sus-
pect distinction require application of an intermediate level of scrutiny
to the government action.7 5 If the classification does not fall under
accredited high school violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
72. See infra notes 86-134 and accompanying text for an analysis of the cases deal-
ing with minors' substantive due process claims based upon juvenile curfew ordinances.
73. In the juvenile curfew ordinance context, only seven decisions indicate that reg-
ulated minors brought equal protection classification claims (not including equal protec-
tion claims based upon the infringement of minors' fundamental rights).
74. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)
(declaring that "rationality is the proper standard by which to test whether compulsory
retirement at age 50 violates equal protection"); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979) (holding that a provision of the Foreign Service Act mandating retirement at age
60 for Foreign Service personnel was not so unrelated to the achievement of any combi-
nation of legitimate purposes that the court could conclude that the legislature's act was
irrational).
In Murgia, the Supreme Court held that uniformed state police officers over the age
of 50 did not constitute a suspect class. 427 U.S. at 313. The Court defined a suspect
class as one which is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id.
(quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). The Murgia
Court went on to posit that while past treatment of the aged has not been wholly free of
discrimination, they have not suffered the stereotypical discrimination or the purposeful
unequal treatment of those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin. Id. The Court concluded that old age does not define a "discrete and
insular" group in need of extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess. Id. Therefore, the Court applied mere rational basis review to the classification of
police officers over 50. Id. at 314.
75. Classifications based on gender are semi-suspect because the Court has found
that this category rarely bears a real and substantial relationship to the legitimate pur-
poses of legislation. See, eg., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S 677, 686 (1973) (hold-
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either of these categories, the reviewing court must deem the regulated
class suspect76 and strictly scrutinize the ordinance to determine if it
offends the equal protection clause.7 7
Very few courts have considered age-based equal protection claims
in the juvenile curfew ordinance context.78 In Johnson v. City of Ope-
lousas,79 a Louisiana federal district court, determining the constitu-
ing that classifications based on sex frequently bear no relation to the ability to perform
or contribute to society). Classifications based upon alienage are semi-suspect because
aliens are a "discrete and insular" minority. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971) (holding that classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect because
aliens are a discrete and insular minority). Classifications based on each of these char-
acteristics receive some form of heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (holding that a gender based distinction in the Social Security
Act did not substantially relate to the attainment of any important and valid statutory
goals); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that classifications based on
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must substantially relate to
the achievement of those objectives); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 688 (holding
that classifications based on gender are inherently suspect and must be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372 (holding that classifica-
tions based on alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
76. See supra note 74 for the Supreme Court definition of a suspect class.
77. A leading constitutional scholar postulates that at least two principles justify the
application of strict scrutiny to suspect classifications such as those based upon race or
national origin: the antisubjugation principle and the antidiscrimination principle. The
antisubjugation principle seeks to:
break down legally created or legally reinforced systems of subordination that treat
some people as second-class citizens. The core value of this principle is that all
people have equal worth. When the legal order that both shapes and mirrors our
society treats some people as outsiders or as though they were worth less than
others, those people have been denied the equal protection of the laws.... The goal
of the equal protection clause [under this principle] is not to stamp out impure
thoughts, but to guarantee a full measure of human dignity for all...
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515-16 (2d ed. 1988).
[In practice,] [t]he antisubjugation principle... [reserves strict judicial scrutiny]
for those government acts that, given their history, context, source, and effect,
seem most likely not only to perpetuate subordination but also to reflect a tradition
of hostility toward an historically subjugated group, or a pattern of blindness or
indifference to the interests of that group.
Id. at 1520.
The antidiscrimination principle merely focuses on the present state action. If the
government enacts legislation which it intends to disparately impact a minority group,
the antidiscrimination principle requires that the court strictly scrutinize the law, re-
gardless of whether that group was historically discriminated against. Id at 1515.
78. See supra note 69 for a list of cases which consider age-based equal protection
claims.
79. 488 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. La. 1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981).
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tionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance,80 failed to follow the Supreme
Court's method of assessing an equal protection claim based on the
age-based classification of those subject to the state action. Rather, the
Johnson court merely recited the Court's view that age classifications
are not suspect and summarily deemed the Opelousas curfew constitu-
tional because it applied equally to all persons under the age of
seventeen.
Alternatively, the court in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown 82
conformed to Supreme Court mandated equal protection doctrine in
assessing the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance.8 3 The
Bykofsky court explained that the age classification built into the Mid-
dletown ordinance rested on a real and substantial difference between
the maturity level of adults and the maturity level of children.84 Based
on this determination, the Bykofsky court applied rational basis review
and concluded that the curfew ordinance's age classification bore a just
and reasonable relation to the government's asserted purposes for en-
acting the law.85
B. The Substantive Due Process Claim
Juvenile curfew ordinances are often attacked on substantive due
80. The Johnson court determined the constitutionality of the Opelousas juvenile
curfew ordinance, which provided in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any unemancipated minor under the age of seventeen (17)
years to travel, loiter, wander, stroll, or play in or upon or traverse any public
streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, places of amusements and entertainment,
places and buildings, vacant lots or other unsupervised places in the City of Ope-
lousas, Louisiana, between the hours of 11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday, Tues-
day, Wednesday or Thursday night and 4 a.m. of the following day, or I a.m. on
any Friday or Saturday night and 4 a.m. of the following day... unless the said
minor is accompanied by his parents, tutor or other responsible adult or unless the
said minor is on an emergency errand.
488 F. Supp. at 436-37 (citing OPELOUSAS, LA. CODE § 18-8.1).
81. Id. at 440.
82. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'dper curiam, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.),
cerL denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976)(three justices dissenting).
83. Id. at 1265. For the text of the Borough of Middletown statute, see infra note
117.
84. 401 F. Supp. at 1265. The court also noted that classifications based on age
exist in various facets of society. For example, the court noted classifications with re-
spect to the rights to marry, drink, contract, and drive. Id. at 1266.
85. Id. See infra note 119 and accompanying text for a list of the Borough's as-
serted interests.
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process grounds.8 6 To determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause 7 proscribes a state action, a court initially deter-
mines whether the action infringes upon a minor's fundamental right.88
86. See infra notes 92-130 and accompanying text for cases in which the defendant
brought substantive due process claims with respect to juvenile curfew ordinances.
87. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part that no state shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. .. ." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
88. The Supreme Court posited that fundamental rights are those which are "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937). Rights the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental include: (1) the right to
travel; see, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (stating that the "freedom
to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under
the Constitution." (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966))); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (stating that "Etlhe Constitutional right to travel
from one state to another... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union" (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966))); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964) (holding that the right to travel abroad is
fundamental); (2) the right to freedom of movement; see, eg., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125-26 (1958) (positing that the "[flreedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values"); (3) the right to vote; see, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S at 336 (positing that
"denying some citizens the right to vote, such laws deprive them of a 'fundamental
political right,... preservative of all rights'" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
562 (1964))); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (holding that a
restriction limiting the vote to owners or lessees of property within certain school dis-
tricts impinges on the right to exercise the franchise in an unimpaired manner, a right
preservative of other political and civil rights); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 22, 31
(1968) (holding that state requirements for a third political party to get on an election
ballot infringed upon the right to vote, the most precious right in a free country);
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (holding that a poll
tax infringes on the right to vote, a right which is fundamental because it preserves all
other rights); (4) the right to marry; see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383
(1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute which provided that anyone with minor issue
not in his custody that he is under a legal obligation to support may not marry without
court approval); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (holding that the
state fees imposed incident to divorce infringed upon one's right to terminate a mar-
riage, "a fundamental human relationship"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(holding that the prohibition of interracial marriages infringed upon the fundamental
right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (stating that "marriage... [is]
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); (5) the right to procreate;
see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (positing that "[i]f the right to
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual.., to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 541 (1942) (posit-
ing that the sterilization of a recidivist who committed felonies involving moral turpi-
tude infringed upon the right to procreate, a right "fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the [human] race"); (6) the right to freedom of personal choice in mat-
ters of family life; see, eg., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(positing that "freedom of personal choice in matters of... family life is one of the
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Traditional substantive due process analysis mandates that a state ac-
tion infringing upon a fundamental right must be necessary and nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling state purpose to survive judicial
scrutiny. 9 If the state action infringes upon a minor's fundamental
right, however, courts often apply a lower level of scruntiny than they
would in the case of an adult.' ° Because courts treat violations of mi-
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974))); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (declaring that the right to raise one's children is "essential"
and "[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment").
The right to marry and the right to make personal decisions with respect to one's
family also fall under the more general fundamental right to privacy. See, e.g., Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 384 (declaring that the Court's decisions "have established that
the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (positing that a prohibition on the use of contraceptives infringes upon
the right to marital privacy).
89. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386-87 (implying that a regulation
which directly and substantially infringes upon the fundamental right to marry must be
subjected to "rigorous" scrutiny); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499 (de-
claring that "when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living ar-
rangements, [the] Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regula-
tion") (emphasis added); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 337 (holding that duration
residency requirements granting some citizens the right to vote and denying others must
promote a state interest); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. at 626 (positing
that "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964))); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 634 (holding that when a classification penalizes the
fundamental right to travel, the classification is unconstitutional unless it is necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31 (de-
claring that when a state regulation interferes with one's voting or first amendment
rights, only a compelling state interest in the regulation will render the regulation con-
stitutional); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (holding Vir-
ginia poll tax unconstitutional).
90. See supra notes 22-65 and accompanying text for an analysis of the justifications
courts give for granting state actions greater deference in the context of juvenile curfew
ordinances. Notably, at the very least, the state action must survive rational basis re-
view; that is, the state action must be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose or it
will fail to survive judicial scrutiny. See, eg., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977)
(positing that if a state regulation does not impinge upon a fundamental right, the Court
will determine if the regulation "rationally relates" to a constitutionally permissible
purpose); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973) (deter-
mining that a school district taxation scheme must rationally further some legitimate,
articulated state purpose to be constitutional); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 733
(1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (declaring that a statute prohibiting any individual other
than an attorney from engaging in debt adjustment "bears a rational relation to a consti-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol41/iss1/6
JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCE
nors' fundamental rights inconsistently, the varying levels of scrutiny
applied to juvenile curfew ordinances must be considered.9"
1. Courts Applying Strict Scrutiny to Juvenile Curfew Ordinances
in the Substantive Due Process Context
In Waters v. Barry,9 2 the District Court for the District of Columbia
recently employed a strict standard of review in assessing the constitu-
tional validity of a juvenile curfew ordinance. The Waters court deter-
mined that the District of Columbia curfew ordinance93 infringed upon
several fundamental rights of minors.94 For example, the court held
that the ordinance infringed upon the minors' rights to walk the streets
and to meet friends for any purpose, rights which the court deemed
integral components of life in free society.9 5 The Waters court de-
clared that the First and Fifth Amendments9 6 protected these funda-
mental liberties.9 7 Therefore, the government must show that it
enacted the curfew ordinance to achieve compelling purposes and that
the proscription narrowly focused on the harms it sought to prevent. 98
tutionally permissible objective"); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955) (holding that a statute which prevented opticians from fitting glasses without a
prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist bore a rational relation to the legit-
imate objective of freeing the eye care profession from all taints of commercialism);
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (stating that "regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not... unconstitutional unless
in the light of the facts... it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis").
91. When engaging in substantive due process analysis, courts do not always enun-
ciate the level of scrutiny applied to the ordinance. One must often infer the standard a
court applied to juvenile curfew ordinances. See Martin E. Mooney, Note, Assessing the
Constitutional Validity of Juvenile Curfew Statutes, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 858, 872
(stating that "it is necessary in some instances to infer the standard used through reli-
ance on the justifications provided by the court to uphold or strike down the [juvenile
curfew ordinance]").
92. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989). See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of the Waters opinion's analysis of children's rights relative
to those of adults.
93. See supra note 49 for a description of the Washington, D.C. Temporary Curfew
Emergency Act of 1989.
94. 711 F. Supp. at 1134.
95. Id.
96. The court based its decision on the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, as
opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, because the District of
Columbia, not a state, enacted and enforced the curfew ordinance. Id. at 1132.
97. Id.
98. 711 F. Supp. at 1135.
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The Waters court found that although the ordinance did not abso-
lutely prohibit minors' rights, the ordinance failed to withstand strict
scrutiny review.99 The court noted the importance of the government's
purpose in enacting the ordinance to protect juveniles from the evils of
the street and to reduce the violence occurring in Washington, D.C.co
Further, it acknowledged that the ordinance provided several impor-
tant exceptions to the restriction which reduced the burden on
juveniles' rights.1"1 These exceptions included exempting minors ac-
companied by parents, minors in automobiles, minors engaged in legiti-
mate work, and minors required by reasonable necessity to conduct an
emergency errand relating to the health of a family member. 2 The
court posited, however, that the curfew's restrictions, not the curfew's
exemptions, determine the ordinance's constitutional validity. 0 3 The
Waters court concluded that the government did not narrowly tailor
the ordinance to achieve its purpose because it stifled the liberty inter-
ests of thousands of innocent, law-abiding juveniles who resided in or
visited the District of Columbia."°' The court therefore invalidated the
juvenile curfew ordinance on the ground that it violated the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.105
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1135, 1139. The Waters court acknowledged that "in the eyes of many,
the crippling effects of crime demand stem responses." Id. at 1135. The court never
found the stated purpose compelling within the meaning of the strict scrutiny test enun-
ciated in Waters. Id. at 1136, 1139.
101. Id. at 1135.
102. 711 F. Supp. at 1135. See supra note 49 for a complete listing of the exceptions
provided by the District of Columbia juvenile curfew ordinance.
103. Id. at 1136.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1137. Several courts have employed strict scrutiny tests to invalidate
juvenile curfew ordinances on the ground that the government failed to show a compel-
ling interest in regulating minors. See, e.g., S.W. v. State, 431 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that "[t]he relationship between the practice of barring
children sixteen years of age or younger from public places unless accompanied by a
parent or guardian and the objective of safeguarding minors is not compelling enough to
justify the serious invasion of personal rights and liberties"); T.F. v. State, 431 So. 2d
342, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (same as S.W. v. State, supra); People v. Chambers,
335 N.E.2d 612, 617-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (invalidating a juvenile curfew ordinance
which infringed upon minors' fundamental rights because a "compelling emergency"
did not exist prior to the curfew's imposition), rev'd, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57-59 (Ill. 1976)
(holding that when a juvenile curfew ordinance is not aimed at the fundamental rights
of minors and promotes important state interests outweighing those of the regulated
minors, the ordinance is constitutionally valid); City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 42 Ohio
Misc. 2d 1, 3 (Wadsworth Mun. Ct. 1987) (holding that the state failed to show a
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Not all courts applying the strict scrutiny standard invalidate juve-
nile curfew ordinances on constitutional grounds. For example, in City
of Milwaukee v. K.F. , 1 the court found that the Milwaukee juvenile
curfew ordinance"0 7 infringed upon minors' rights of freedom of move-
ment, freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
and freedom of religion.1°8 Accordingly, the KF. court applied a strict
scrutiny test requiring the city to show that it narrowly tailored the
curfew ordinance to achieve a compelling purpose.' 9 The court found
that the city drafted the ordinance as narrowly as practicable because it
compelling interest justifying the governmental intrusion on the fundamental rights of
minors resulting from the imposition of a juvenile curfew ordinance); Allen v. City of
Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478,486 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (same as Owens); In re
Mosier, 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 97-98 (C.P. Van Wert County 1978) (same as Owens).
Others have employed the test to invalidate curfew ordinances which were not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling purpose. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas,
658 F.2d 1065, 1072-74 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that a juvenile curfew ordinance
proscribing a number of innocent activities must be narrowed to achieve the govern-
ment's asserted purposes of protecting youths, reducing nocturnal juvenile crime, and
promoting parental control over children); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp.
1381, 1385 (D.N.H. 1984) (invalidating a statute which was "so broadly drawn that it
impermissibly curtails... juveniles' personal liberty interest in free movement to pursue
nondelinquent activities"); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wash.
1973) (concluding that a juvenile curfew ordinance which failed to distinguish between
conduct calculated to harm and essentially innocent conduct did not bear a real or
substantial relationship to the state's asserted purpose of protecting minors); Alves v.
Justice Court, 306 P.2d 601, 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (concluding that a juvenile curfew
statute infringing on a number of innocent activities did not bear any real and substan-
tial relation to the control of juveniles during the night, the statute's primary purpose);
Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (concluding that the
government could not legitimately restrain minors from engaging in innocent activity
on the streets because those who committed indiscretions at night would be amenable to
the law).
106. 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1988).
107. The Milwaukee juvenile curfew ordinance provides in pertinent part:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person under the age of seventeen (17) years to con-
gregate, loiter, wander, stroll, stand or play in or upon the public streets, highways,
roads, alleys, parks, public buildings, places of amusement and entertainment, va-
cant lots or any public places in the city of Milwaukee, either on foot or in or upon
any conveyance being driven or parked thereon, between the hours of 11 p.m. and
5 a.m. of the following day... unless accompanied by [a] parent, guardian or other
adult....
MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 106-23 (1943), quoted in City of Milwau-
kee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d at 332.
108. 426 N.W.2d at 337.
109. Id. at 339. The court failed to explicitly state that these rights were funda-
mental with respect to minors. Furthermore, the KF. court found it unnecessary to
determine whether to apply a less stringent level of scrutiny to the Milwaukee juvenile
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restricted juvenile activity in public places for a short period of time
each day and contained various exemptions for children accompanied
by adults.11° The court also found that the municipality's interests in
protecting youths and curtailing juvenile crime were compelling within
the meaning of the court's strict scrutiny standard. 1 ' Therefore, the
court held the Milwaukee juvenile curfew ordinance constitutional
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause.' 12
2. Courts Applying Rational Basis Review to Juvenile Curfew
Ordinances in the Substantive Due Process Context
In performing substantive due process analyses, a small number of
courts merely require that a governmental action directed towards mi-
curfew ordinance because the regulation would withstand even the most rigorous exam-
ination by the tribunal. Id.
110. Id. The court also acknowledged that the city sought to pursue these interests
solely by "prevent[ing] the undirected or aimless activity of minors during the curfew
hours," further demonstrating the court's view that the Milwaukee juvenile curfew ordi-
nance was narrowly tailored to achieve the city's asserted goals. Id.
111. Ia
112. 426 N.W.2d at 340. The court in Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d
688 (Md. 1964) also validated a juvenile curfew ordinance applying an arguably strict
standard of review. The Thistlewood court determined whether a juvenile curfew ordi-
nance was reasonable by asking (1) was there an evil the government sought to prevent?
(2) did the means selected to curb the evil have a real and substantial relation to the
result sought? and (3) if the result of the first two inquiries was yes, did the means
unduly infringe or oppress fundamental rights of those whose activities or conduct was
curbed? Id. at 693. The court determined that the evil the ordinance sought to prevent
was the formation of and resulting unlawful acts of disorderly groups. Id. The court
then posited that the ordinance's proscription on the nighttime activities of minors bore
a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be obtained. Id. The Thistlewood
court determined that the curfew did not infringe upon the fundamental rights of mi-
nors because the government was permitted to regulate and restrict the activities of
minors under twenty-one years of age to a far greater extent than those of adults. Id.
Therefore, the court held the Ocean City juvenile curfew ordinance constitutionally
valid. Id. at 694. See also Mooney, supra note 91, at 872 (arguing that the third inquiry
in Thistlewood "seems analogous to the compelling interest test").
Only one other court has upheld a juvenile curfew ordinance under strict scrutiny.
See In re C., 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121 (Cal Ct. App. 1972) (upholding a juvenile curfew
ordinance scrutinized under the Thistlewood test because forbidding "juveniles from
loitering in the streets during nighttime hours [had] a real and substantial relationship
to the dual goal of protection of children and the community, and the ordinance [in
question did] not unduly restrict the rights of minors"). But see Mooney, supra note 91,
at 875 (arguing that the In re C. court considered the Thistlewood test "more akin to
the rational basis than the compelling interest standard").
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nors rationally relate to a legitimate end to survive judicial scrutiny. 113
Courts use this lenient standard of review with respect to minors for
two reasons. First, courts find that minors are altogether incapable of
having fundamental rights in particular situations. 4 Pursuant to sub-
stantive due process doctrine, once a court determines that the right at
stake is not fundamental, it must apply rational basis review to the
state action. Second, courts find that in certain circumstances minors'
activities may be regulated to a greater extent than those of adults.11 5
Therefore, courts passively scrutinize some laws which infringe upon
the fundamental rights of minors.
Courts seldom utilize rational basis review when determining the
constitutional validity of a juvenile curfew ordinance. For example,
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown "6 is the only federal court to ap-
ply this standard to a substantive due process claim on behalf of a mi-
nor regulated by a juvenile curfew. 7
113. See infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of rational basis
review.
114. See, eg., People ex rel. J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223 (Colo. 1989) (holding that a
child's liberty interest in movement does not constitute a fundamental right).
115. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1257 (M.D. Pa. 1975)
(recognizing that the state may restrict the activities of children to a greater degree than
those of adults because children must be protected from the public and the public must
be protected from the children), aff'd per curiam, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 394 (1976) (three justices dissenting); People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 501
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945) (affirming that because "minors constitute a class
founded upon a natural and intrinsic distinction from adults... legislation peculiarly
applicable to them is necessary for their proper protection"). See also supra notes 22-34
and accompanying text.
116. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 394 (1976)(three justices dissenting).
117. The court determined the constitutional validity of the Borough of Mid-
dletown juvenile curfew ordinance, which provides in pertinent part:
Section 4. Curfew for minors It shall be unlawful for any person 17 or less years of
age (under 18) to be or remain in or upon the streets within the Borough of Mid-
dletown at night during the period ending at 6 A.M. and beginning
(a) at 10 P.M. for minors I 1 or less years of age,
(b) 10:30 P.M. for minors 12 or 13 years of age, and
(c) at 11 P.M. for minors 14 or more years of age.
Section 5 lists a series of exceptions whereby a minor may be present on a borough
street during the proscribed hours. Several of the exceptions include times when a mi-
nor is: accompanied by a parent or an adult authorized by a parent to accompany the
minor; exercising first amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution;
acting in a case of reasonable necessity; on the sidewalk of the place where such minor
resides; returning from a school activity, or an activity of religious or other voluntary
association; carrying a certified card of employment; or in a motor vehicle with parental
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In Bykofsky, the court initially determined whether the government
had legitimate purposes in enacting the curfew.1"" The government as-
serted four interests justifying the ordinance: (1) protecting younger
children in Middletown from each other and adults on the street dur-
ing nighttime hours; (2) enforcing parental control of and responsibil-
ity for their children; (3) protecting the public from minors' nocturnal
mischief; and (4) reducing the incidence of juvenile criminal activity." 9
The court failed to explicitly acknowledge the legitimacy of these pur-
poses and proceeded to analyze whether the ordinance was rationally
related to the asserted purposes without discussing their validity.1 °
In assessing the relationship between the curfew and the interests of
the Borough of Middletown, the court concluded that a curfew which
keeps unsupervised children off the street at night must protect chil-
dren.121 It also found that the curfew encouraged parents to supervise,
control and know the whereabouts of their children during nighttime
hours by imposing criminal penalties on the parent of a child found on
the street in violation of the curfew. 22 The Bykofsky court concluded
that the curfew achieved the stated goals of preventing juvenile mis-
chief and crime because the Borough's crime statistics indicated that
mischievous and criminal activity among regulated juveniles decreased
since the curfew's enactment.123 Therefore, the court concluded that
the Borough of Middletown curfew furthered the purposes for which it
was enacted and was rationally related to the means chosen.
1 24
consent. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. at 1269-70 (quoting Boa-
OUGH OF MIDDLETOWN, PA. ORDINANCE 662 (March 10, 1975)).
118. 401 F. Supp. at 1255.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 401 F. Supp. at 1255.
123. Id. at 1255-56. The court took judicial notice of the rapidly increasing crime
rate among teenagers and that juveniles committed a large percentage of all serious
crime. For example, it relied on testimony indicating that juveniles under the age of
eighteen accounted for 25% of all nighttime arrests during 1970. Id. The Bykofsky
court based its conclusion that the Borough curfew ordinance was effective on evidence
indicating that "while there was a decrease in crime during curfew hours for both mi-
nors and adults, there was a greater relative decrease for the minors who are subject to
the curfew." Id. at 1256.
124. Id. It should be noted that the Bykofsky court, unlike those courts applying
the strict scrutiny standard, failed to determine whether the Borough of Middletown
narrowly tailored the juvenile curfew ordinance to achieve their asserted purposes.
After completing its rational basis review analysis, the court went on to determine the
reasonableness of the curfew as an exercise of the Borough's police power. Id. at 1256-
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A few state courts assess the constitutionality of juvenile curfew or-
dinances by applying rational basis review. For example, in People ex
rel. JM. ,12 the court applied rational basis review to the Pueblo, Colo-
rado juvenile curfew ordinance.1 26 The government asserted the same
interests as those asserted in Bykofsky to justify their ordinance. 27
The court determined that these purposes were legitimate within the
meaning of the rational basis standard.1 28 The government drafted the
curfew ordinance as narrowly as possible to further their goals without
unduly infringing upon minors' liberty interests; the ordinance re-
stricted minors for only a short period of time and only in certain
public places.129 The court therefore held that the Pueblo juvenile cur-
few ordinance was rationally related to the state's legitimate goals
asserted.
130
58. The court relied on their finding that the state's interests in enacting the curfew
outweighed the minors' right to freedom of movement in validating the Borough of
Middletown juvenile curfew ordinance. Id. at 1258.
125. 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989). See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text for
an analysis of the People ex teL J.M. court's treatment of minors' rights relative to those
of adults.
126. 768 P.2d at 223. The court merely required the state to "establish a legiti-
mate purpose and a rational relation between the means employed and the goals to be
obtained," because the minor defendant's freedom of movement was not a fundamental
right. Id. See supra note 36 for the text of the Pueblo, Colorado juvenile curfew ordi-
nance. Id.
127. Id. See supra note 119 and accompanying text for government asserted state
interests in Bykofsky.
128. 768 P.2d at 223.
129. Id. at 224. The court determined that the Pueblo, Colorado curfew ordinance
left a minor "free to participate in any activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic,
so long as he travels directly to or from that activity." IL
The court also distinguished curfews which forbid the presence of minors in a public
place from those which prevent minors from loitering in the streets. Id. The court
noted that while several courts had upheld "loitering" ordinances, many others invali-
dated "presence" curfews. Id. The court concluded that the Pueblo curfew ordinance
merely prevented minors from aimlessly roaming the streets. Id. Therefore, the People
ex reL J.M. court held the loitering proscription valid within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id.
Arguably, the court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the Pueblo curfew
ordinance because the court posited that the curfew was drawn as narrowly as possible
to achieve the asserted government purposes. Id. In order to survive judicial scrutiny
under the rational basis standard, an ordinance need not be so limited in scope.
130. Id. Other courts applying rational basis review have also upheld the constitu-
tionality of juvenile curfew ordinances. See, eg., In re Baker, 17 Dauph. 17, 23-25
(Dauphin County, Pa. 1914). Some courts applying this standard, however, have invali-
dated juvenile curfew ordinances. See, eg., W.J.W. v. State, 356 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a prohibition against a child's presence in public
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3. Concluding Remarks Concerning the Treatment of Minors'
Substantive Due Process Claims in the Juvenile Curfew
Ordinance Context
The foregoing analysis indicates the high level of confusion which
exists among the lower courts in evaluating juveniles' substantive due
process claims. This confusion stems from the Supreme Court's rudi-
mentary framework for assessing minors' rights."' The Court's inade-
quate treatment of minors' rights is most apparent in the juvenile
curfew ordinance context. Courts generally agree that all curfews in-
fringe upon minors' rights. However, considerable disagreement exists
concerning whether particular juveniles' rights that are violated by an
ordinance should be characterized as fundamental.132 Pursuant to
traditional substantive due process analysis, the court must undertake
this consideration before determining a curfew ordinance's constitu-
tionality.133 The Supreme Court has set forth only limited guidelines
for lower courts to follow in assessing whether a minor's particular
right is fundamental. As a result, some courts may deem that right
fundamental while other courts may not. Based on these discrepant
determinations, the courts then apply the corresponding level of scru-
tiny to the curfew ordinance which determines the law's validity.134
places during specified nighttime hours does not have any real relationship to control-
ling the activities of children at night, the primary purpose of the proscription).
131. See supra notes 22-34, 66-67 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
Supreme Court's framework for determining the rights of minors.
132. For example, several courts accept that juvenile curfew ordinances infringe
upon a minor's right to movement; however, there is a split among these courts as to
whether this right is fundamental. Compare Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1134
(D.D.C. 1989) (holding that a juvenile curfew ordinance restricts minors' fundamental
right of movement) and City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 42 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 2-3 (Wad-
sworth Mun. Ct. 1987) (same as Waters); with People ex rel. J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 223
(Colo. 1989) (holding that a juvenile curfew ordinance restricts minors' non-fundamen-
tal right of movement).
133. See supra note 88 for decisions which adhere to the traditional substantive due
process doctrine.
134. Compare, eg., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. at 1125 (holding that the minors'
fundamental right of movement requires strict scrutiny and the juvenile curfew ordi-
nance in question was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling purpose) and City
of Wadsworth v. Owens, 42 Ohio Misc. 2d at 2-3 (holding that because the minors'
right of movement is fundamental, a juvenile curfew ordinance must satisfy strict scru-
tiny) with People ex rel. J.M., 768 P.2d at 223-24 (holding that an infringement on
minors' non-fundamental right of movement requires rational basis review and the juve-
nile curfew ordinance was rationally related to achieving the state's asserted legitimate
purposes).
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The courts' inconsistent determinations as to whether a minor's partic-
ular right is fundamental produces inconsistent results on whether a
curfew ordinance survives substantive due process scrutiny.
IV. PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court should establish a comprehensive analytical
scheme upon which lower courts may rely in assessing whether a mi-
nor's right is fundamental in a particular circumstance. To accomplish
this goal, the Court should add a new, intermediate level of scrutiny to
its present substantive due process framework. Because minors have
lived for a short period of time is no reason to deprive them of their
fundamental rights - rights to which all others in society are entitled.
The state has a special interest in the protection of its minors, however,
and the Court should grant more deference to restrictions on children's
fundamental rights than restrictions on adult's rights.13 5 Taking into
account both of these concerns, the Court should declare that a state
action directed solely at minors must substantially relate to an impor-
tant governmental interest unique to minors before the government
may constitutionally infringe upon their fundamental rights. Under
this test, minors' fundamental rights are the same as those of adults.
In applying this test to an age of majority-based classification estab-
lished in a juvenile curfew ordinance, a court must initially determine
whether the state has an important and unique interest in keeping chil-
dren off the streets at night. For example, if a municipality asserts that
its interest in enacting the curfew is to protect minors from themselves,
a court must determine whether this governmental interest is impor-
tant and unique to children. Although the protection of minors is im-
portant, children are not the only people who need protection from
themselves and from others at night. Therefore, because the govern-
ment has no unique interest in regulating the minor, the curfew fails to
withstand this new form of heightened scrutiny.
If the court determines, however, that the state has a unique and
important interest in keeping children off the street, it should consider
whether the curfew ordinance substantially relates to this interest. For
example, because the curfew always keeps children in the home, the
curfew protects children from themselves and others. This protection
135. The Supreme Court has found that the state often has a special interest in
children. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (holding that "the
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adults" (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944))).
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occurs primarily because the regulated youths will be less accessible to
other children and adults than if permitted in public. Therefore, the
curfew bears a substantial relation to the state interest.
V. CONCLUSION
The lower courts have had tremendous difficulty in assessing the
rights of minors. This difficulty is most apparent in the courts' sub-
stantive due process analysis of juvenile curfew ordinances. In this
area, the courts have displayed their confusion by inconsistently assess-
ing whether minors' rights are fundamental. As a result of these dis-
crepant determinations, courts have inconsistently applied different
levels of scrutiny to juvenile curfew ordinances. This confusion is a
direct result of the Supreme Court's failure to establish a coherent doc-
trine with respect to minors' fundamental rights. The Supreme Court
should declare a new level of heightened scrutiny which accounts for
minors' fundamental rights and their unique position in society. Ad-
herence to this proposal will enable lower courts to uniformly and
fairly assess the constitutional rights of minors.
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